SETTLEMENT AND UNSETTLEMENT IN THE
RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTATION PROGRAM
CLARENCE

A.

WILEY*

In the by and large, the Resettlement Administration had no particular program
which can be said to have arisen strictly out of the administrative set-up which
functioned during the period from July i, 1935, down to December 31, 1936. On the

one hand, the program which it administered was an adopted child whose paternal
forbear was the F.E.R.A., which later employed tutors and guardians in the form
of state Rural. Rehabilitation Corporations.' The particular phase of the Resettlement Administration's program known as rehabilitation related especially to that
portion of its work which was designed primarily to advance subsistence and capital
goods to very low-income farmers who, without such assistance, could not continue
to carry on their farming operations. This inability to carry on resulted, from
region to region or within a given region, from a multiplicity of causes such as, crop
failure, foreclosure on land or livestock, loss of supplementary employment, or the
occupancy of poor land giving forth only meager yields that had to be sold at
depression prices. The other aspect of its program was inherited from the National
Resources Committee and attempted to deal primarily with those aspects of the farm
problem which grew out of a misdirected, not to say vicious, national land policy.
The program, therefore, cannot be said to be that of any particular national or
state governmental agency. It rather represented the consolidated programs of
various national and state agencies, some portions of which were designed to be
stop-gaps, plaster, and patch-work upon the tattered and smeared agricultural pattern then existing. For the most part they consisted of emergency measures for an
emergency situation. Other phases of the program attempted to apply remedies to
chronic maladjustments that had been destined sooner or later to bring the distress
to agriculture which was in fact ushered in sooner by the depression.
0 A.B., 192o, A.M., 1921, University of Texas; Ph.D., 1926, University of Wisconsin. Professor of Economics, University of Texas. Author: Agriculture and the Business Cycle since zg2o--A Study in the
Disparity of Prices. Contributor to professional economic journals. The writer was for a brief period in
1935 Acting State Director, Rural Rehabilitation for Texas. For some time thereafter, until September,
1936, he was Chief, Land Use Planning Section, Resettlement Administration, for Region V which comprises the states of Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida-an area manifesting almost every aspect
of land problems possible anywhere.
'Ile legislative and administrative development of the program isED.discussed in Oppenheimer, The
inIra p. 473.
Development of-the Rural Rehabilitation Loan Program,
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In broad perspective, therefore, the program consisted of two main segments:
(i) temporary relief, either as outright grants, or in the form of loans at low rates

of interest for subsistence and for capital goods; (2) long-range planning that involved readjustments in land use, more economical sized farms, better systems of
farming, feasible cooperative arrangements among farmers, soil conservation, retirement from use of submarginal crop lands, and opportunity for the resettling on good
farm lands of farm families stranded on poor land. The entire program was a rather
ambitious one, and one which had need for the best administrative and technical
advice available in the nation. However, the magnitude of the task, its emergency

character, the decentralization of planning (especially in the long-range aspects of
the program), the absence of provision for scissor wielders on administrative red
tape, the delay in reaching decisions, and frequent changes in policy all contributed
to about as much unsettlement as settlement and resettlement in the program. A
more complete analysis of the program, with a sympathetic effort to appraise the
various methods of approach to the multiplicity of problems presented, will be attempted following a brief survey of the agricultural situation which seemed to justify
the gigantic nation-wide attempt at temporary remedial measures and long-range
adjustments.
AcuTE AGRICULTURAL

APOPLEXY

The health of the agricultural industry has been none too good since its spree of
expansion, technological improvement, and land speculation instigated in part by
its own initiative and in part as the result of governmental policy during and immediately following the World War. Beginning in the fall of i92o it began to
experience the severe morning-after headache that follows the night before. The
conjunction of events thereafter was not such as to permit complete recovery,
with the result that the depression struck a weak and tottering industry such a blow
that remedial measures were inevitable. The final "stroke," however, was only a
symptom of many organic ailments of long standing. This situation was not
peculiar to agriculture. Financial institutions, manufacturing establishments, transportation companies, etc., also had taken their sprees and experienced their headaches. Resulting ailments and maladjustments were partly of an emergency character, and in part also of a chronic nature. The cries for governmental succor rose
up from every nook and cranny of our economic system. The particular assistance
given agriculture, indeed, was different from that administered to non-agricultural
enterprises, but only in the extent and degree to which seasoned judgment considered
warranted by the exigencies of the situation and the peculiar nature of the industry
and its current problems.
The agricultural situation which confronted the nation once the depression had
wrought some of its havoc upon the agricultural population may be glimpsed by
the following brief summary. Rather early in the depression the nation found itself
confronted with the problem of providing food and shelter for a vast army of unem-
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ployed of undetermined size. Unemployment was a fact, and the situation demanded action. It was no time to weigh judgments as to the degree of individual
responsibility for one's situation. Unemployed farm laborers, dispossessed tenants,
farmers who were out of work because they had lost either their teams and tools or
their land, and farmers who had some land but insufficient moisture, or were
lacking seed to carry on their farming operations, presented largely the same
problem as did the unemployed from non-agricultural industries. Others still on
the land had made so little and/or got so little for what they made that they were
without subsistence for themselves and their work animals until another crop could
be harvested. Little work and less credit were available under the existing situation.
Therefore, when the F.E.R.A. was established in May, 1933, many rural cases were
cared for under the program, especially during the following winter months. Under
the above program cash grants were made to the several states for .direct or work
relief under federal supervision. In the fall of X933 the C. W. A. was set up to
provide jobs for those unemployed and for those whose incomes from employment
were deemed inadequate to provide reasonable subsistence. In the spring of x934
this feature of the program was displaced by the work relief program of the F.E.R.A.
The intention was to give jobs to relief clients in order to dispense with direct relief
because of the disfavor with which the "dole" was generally regarded. But work
relief was less available to unemployed farm laborers and heads of other distressed
farm families than to the unemployed in other fields, unless they migrated to the
villages and towns, a thing which many of them did.
In the process of aiding needy farm families, it soon occurred to F.E.R.A. officials that these families logically fell into two main categories. First, there were
those who needed only subsistence for themselves or their livestock, and funds for
medical care, clothing and planting seed. When work relief was given, wages were
usually credited against advances made. Practically all distressed farmers in the
western drought area were cared for in this manner, up to the spring of x935, on
their purchases of feed. Along with work relief there was also a greater or less
volume of direct relief grants, varying of course from one family or locality to
another. Second, it was evident that theie were many farmers (and farm laborers
to a lesser degree) who could become self-supporting if given advances in cash in
the form of loans with which to buy teams, tools and equipment, seed, and fertilizer
in addition to grants for subsistence. Loans and grants of this sort were designated
"rehabilitation" on the assumption that this policy would eliminate recurring direct
relief grants. Consequently, in the spring of x934 by administrative order a separate
Rural Rehabilitation Division was charged with the responsibility of handling the
needs of distressed farm families in the western drought area.
At the expense of the omission of a vast amount of detail incident to the administration of the program, the chief point of interest here is to indicate the magnitude
of the task involved, and the national scope of the program. By the winter of
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1934-35 something over one million farm and farm laborer families were receiving

relief grants and/or rehabilitation loans, a fact which is indicative of the extent of
rural distress. Indeed, approximately two million families received relief at one
time or another during the depression. A significant. fact about this tremendous
number of distressed farm and farm laborer families is that the bulk of them was
concentrated in fourteen states representing only one-fourth the farms of the United
States. This peculiar situation points very definitely to the conclusion that there is
a distinct causal connection between the ratio of distressed families to total farm
families in an area, and the particular rural economic and social patterns of that
area. The fourteen states in order of their ratio of farm operators receiving relief
to all farm operators in the state are as follows:
Ratio on relief
17

Ratio on relief

New Mexico .................
South Dakota ................
North Dakota ................
Oklahoma ...................
Colorado ....................
Kentucky ....................
Florida ......................

27

Idaho .......................
Montana .....................
M innesota ...................

27
22

Pennsylvania . : ............... .12
Arkansas .................... iI

19

South Carolina ...............

ii

i8

Wyoming ....................

io

36
33

13
12

These fourteen states may be definitely classified according to the predominant
feature, or features, responsible for agricultural distress. In the main, they are external to the economy of the individual farmer, and therefore, largely beyond his
control. Chief among these by states were:
Drought

New Mexico

Oklahoma
Colorado
Idaho

Abandonment or
removal of industry

Physicalfeatures:
poor land,rugged, eroded.
Overpopulated

Pennsylvania*

South Carolina

Kentucky*
Florida*
Minnesota*

Arkansas

Montana

Kentucky*

Pennsylvania*
Florida*

Wyoming
North Dakota
South Dakota
Minnesota*
* States affected by more than one factor.

The above classification of causes for distress in agricultural areas is perhaps in
categories too broad to reveal significant implications with reference to individual
farm problems. For this reason, it should be broken down, and numerous other
contributing factors added. Moreover, additional light can be thrown on the nature
of the problems, in so far as they were either directly or indirectly causes of recent
'It is important to note, however, that all these families were not currently engaged in agriculture.
Many of them had left the farm earlier in the depression to seek employment in villages and towns. On
account of their usual occupation they were classified as farm families.

46o

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

farm distress, by classifying them as (i) more or less temporary contributing factors
and (2) long-run factors contributing to maladjustments in land use and to low
farm family net incomes. Some attempt, therefore, has been made in the table below
to arrive at such a classification, however inadequate it may be.
Chief emergency, or
short-run factors

Chronic, or long-range factors contributing to
current maladjustments

(i) Drought
(2) Floods
(3) Loss of job
(4) Foreclosure on livestock and/or farm
(5) Dispossessed as tenant
(6) Loss of assets through depression
prices or otherwise
(7) Death or ill health of earning member of household
(8) Unavailable credit resources
(9) Low purchasing power of farm products incident to the depression

(i) The pressure of rural birth rate in relation to rural economic opportunities
(2) The use of sub-marginal lands for
cropping purposes
(3) Soil depletion resulting from uneconomical farming practices
(4) Farm units too small
(5) Failure to adopt farming systems
adapted to character of an area
(6) The depletion of natural resources,
frequently timber, which normally
provided supplementary employment
(7) Over-capitalization of land values
(8) The swelling intensity of institutional
forces conducive to inequality of rural
opportunity, resulting in poverty, tenancy, and large numbers of unattached laborers.

It was the incidence of this multiplicity of emergency and long-run factors which
fell with crushing weight upon approximately one-third of the farm families of the
natior at one time or another during the depression. So far as the rural problem
was concerned, it was with this large and widely scattered group of afflicted rural
families that the F.E.RA. and the Rural Rehabilitation Corporations attempted to
deal. A cross section of this group in June, 1935, reveals 138,ooo farm owners, 280,000
tenants (other than share croppers), 44,o0 share croppers, and i47,ooo farm laborers.
From this cross section of those in need of aid, it is evident that great variation
existed as to (i) the causes of their distress and (2) the type of aid which would
be most effective.
For all those who still had land and livestock to carry on current operations,
or begin another year's crop, but whose liquid assets had been exhausted, and whose
current incomes had been depleted or reduced to nothing, the need was primarily
for an immediate source of income. This could be provided in the main only from
work relief or direct relief grants. Whenever work could be provided by F.E.R.A.,
or C.WA., wages were paid in cash or credited against relief grants, provided they
were loan cases. Still another group. comprised low-level owners, some tenants,
many share croppers, and perhaps a still larger proportion of farm laborers who were
partially or wholly deficient in either land, livestock, or tools and equipment. These
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needed aid of a little different character, else relief grants would be ever-recurring
events. Farmers who had an even chance or better to attain a self-supporting status,
provided they could receive advances temporarily in the form of subsistence and
capital goods, were eventually transferred from the general relief rolls to the custody
of the Rural Rehabilitation Corporations. Farm operators carrying on in this
3
capacity were thereafterwards referred to as rehabilitation clients
On this basis of selection, it is evident that a large majority of such clientele
would be located in the southern states where poverty and illiteracy held their
strongest grip. More farm operators, both white and black, who were deficient
either in land, or teams and tools, or all of these at once, could be found in the
South than in any equal area in the country. Accordingly, in February, 1935, more
than ninety per cent of rehabilitation clients were located in ten southern states. For
the most part, then, the rural rehabilitation program in the South was a device for
"furnishing" croppers and tenants, although smaller percentages of farm owners and
farm laborers were included in the program. However, during the spring of 1935
the number of rehabilitation cases increased very markedly in the Southwest and
the far Middlewest because of an administrative ruling which required the Rural
Rehabilitation Division of the F.E.R.A. to include drought relief cases within the
scope of its activities. With the arrival of June, 1935, the number of rural rehabilitation cases had swelled to 2o3,612, to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of
other rural families receiving either outright grants or work relief.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is readily apparent that the fundamental
purpose of the rehabilitation program was twofold; namely, first, emergency relief
to a selective group of farm operators, and, secondly, rehabilitation through longrange corrective measures by means of constructive individual farming programs
for the clients concerned. But to other agencies of the Resettlement Administration
were left the broad aspects of the problem of long-range adjustments through the
instrumentality of resettlement and land use planning. In regard to the first aspect
of the rural rehabilitation program, according to the original intent of administrative
officials when the Rehabilitation Division was set up, it was undoubtedly contemplated that the program emphasize long-range corrective measures through
planned farm programs for rehabilitation clients. The chief purpose of the Division
as originally declared was to "assist destitute farm families and other families residing in rural areas to become self-supporting and independent of emergency relief
aid." This evidently meant more than a mere reclassification of the grants which
such clients were to receive. But in so far as the program consisted of "furnishing"
tenants and croppers (a service which landlords used to render but now could not,
or would not if the government would do it) and of providing aid to drought
families for the purchase of feed for livestock, the Administration was merely functioning as an emergency agency.

3

If a farm operator was receiving both relief grants and rehabilitation advances, he was regarded as a
rehabilitation client.
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During any given month only a small portion of the total rehabilitation cases
may have received advances during that month, since advances of funds during

previous months to an individual made of him a rehabilitation client until the loan
was paid provided he was still a participant in the farm rehabilitation program.
Accordingly, in December, 1935, advances were made to i56,ooo individual clients,
260o of which were loan cases and 130,000 grant cases. 4 This particular month, how-

ever, was an unusual one in this respect. For the most part, during the entire program, advances to rehabilitation clients were for the purchase of capital goods
rather than for subsistence goods in the ratio of about three to one, varying of
course from time to time and place to place.
In so far as the objective of the rehabilitation program was to raise the tenure
status and economic position of submerged farm operators and farm laborers by
means of long-range individual farm programs, it no doubt did not achieve its goal.
Relatively few farm laborers and share croppers were made tenants, and in instances
where such was the case, there is little evidence that the conditions and circumstances
under which they were to operatd could provide more than an element of security at
a very low level of living. For the most part, they were merely removed from
dependence upon certain types of work relief. Even then, much relief had to be
provided for many rehabilitation clients because their small-scale farms offered no
assurance of an independent existence. It is true, each rehabilitation client was
supposed to have prepared for him by his immediate rehabilitation supervisor comprehensive farm plans that would eventually leave him actually rehabilitated-a
moderately prosperous, self-respecting farm operator. This result, however, has not
been achieved, and primarily for the reason that such farm plans as were made for
clients were carelessly and hastily drawn up with one chief end in view, namely,
that of getting subsistence from the soil in lieu of emergency grants and work relief.
The program was largely in effect only work relief in tilling small individual plots
of poor soil with teams and tools of poor quality, most of which were purchased
with F.E.R.A. funds at highly inflated prices. In the main, the client was restored
to an economic and tenure status of a character which had been largely responsible
for sending hundreds of thousands to the relief rolls. His position achieved security
so long as federal funds were forthcoming, but it was not one which by any means
would establish him as an independent producer eventually able to weather the tide
of another depression without public aid. More constructive land use adjustments
and farm programs altogether unlike those, which had contributed to the agricultural distress were universally regarded by land use experts as indispensable. The
Land Policy Section of the National Resources Committee, the Land Use Pjanning
Section of the Division of Land Utilization of the United States Department of
Agriculture, and various other federal and state agencies had made a start in tackling
the chronic maladjustments contributing to agricultural distress from a long-range
'Farmers on Relief and Rehabilitation, W. P. A., Div. oF Socil.A

SCIENCE RrEsMECH (1936) p. 22.

THE

RESE=LmMENT ADMNsTRATION PROGRAM

point of view. It was, however, at about this point in the development of the
emergency and long-range aspects of the entire rehabilitation and readjustment
program that the Resettlement Administration took over the entire job.
THE RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S INHERITANCE AND SUBSEQUENT PROGRAM

On July I, 1935, the Resettlement Administration took over the administration
of the rehabilitation and resettlement programs initiated by F.E.R.A., and also the
major portion of the work started by the Land Policy Section of the National Resources Committee, and of the Land Use Planning Section of the United States
Department of Agriculture. The chief objective in this change in administrative
setup was to coordinate under one agency both the corrective measures of an emergency character and those aimed at evils of a long-run character which had contributed largely to growing agricultural distress for a number of years prior to the
depression.
Thus, with this twofold objective in mind, the major portion of its program
logically fell along two chief lines of action: first, the continuation of the rehabilitation program of the Rural Rehabilitation Division of F.E.R.A., and, second, the
making of land use adjustments as a long-time program to prevent the continuation
and/or recurrence of the situation with which the Rehabilitation Division was then
trying to cope. The former line of action was carried on much as it had been done
by the State Rehabilitation Corporations, except perhaps with less dispatch-because
of the hierarchy of organization-and in that the policy of leasing land (at exorbitant
or other prices) for occupancy by rehabilitation clients was largely discontinuedone policy much to its credit. The type of assistance which was afforded farm
operators was, in the main, in the form of cash advances for (i) subsistence and
(2) capital goods 5 to be used upon the land on which they were then located or
possibly might subsequently live upon. This aspect of rehabilitation was termed
rehabilitation "in place" in contrast to the "resettlement" of families from poor land
areas in areas of better land if rehabilitation under the latter circumstances seemed
more feasible. Of course the "resettlement" of families under more favorable circumstances in new land areas was essentially a long-range program which could
be effected only through a thorough study of the problem of desirable land use
adjustments. In this connection, theoretically at least, much emphasis was to be
placed upon the advice and counsel of land use planning specialists. This portion
of the program was more difficult and, therefore, received relatively less attention.
Yet, while this aspect of the program was the one in which much lasting good could
have been achieved, because of lack of coordination in planning and because of
divided responsibility in the details of procedure the results fell far short of the
possible maximum in view of the personnel and funds available for instituting a
"Subsistence" goods referred chiefly to those necessary for current keep of the family and of work
stock. "Capital" goods included durable goods used in the production of a crop.
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constructive program-an aspect which will be analyzed more at length in the
succeeding section.
The strictly rehabilitation "in place" aspect of the program tapered off largely
into one of advancing loans to needy owners, tenants, share croppers, and a few
former agricultural laborers, to all of whom the usual avenues to credit were then
dosed, especially the resources of the Farm Credit Administration. Rehabilitation
"in place" was, therefore, more nearly just another venture of the federal government in the extension of credit to high-credit-risk farmers than it was anything else.
While associated with the Resettlement Administration, the writer received on his
desk many letters forwarded from offices of the Farm Credit Administration which it
had previously received from farmers pleading for credit based upon some shady
security which was deemed an unjustified risk by the latter agency. This class made
up the recruits to rehabilitation. In fact, any potential client who could secure credit
from any other source was unacceptable to the Rural Rehabilitation Division.
There is no intent at this point, in the least, to disparage the liberal extension of
credit to distressed farmers who cannot offer the security demanded by so-called
sound banking practice-not that at all. The point simply is that such a policy partakes more of the character of an emergency measure than of a long-range, constructive readjustment-unless there is some fundamental basis for the contention that
the chief factor contributing to agricultural distress has been the deficiency of farm
credit. On the contrary, in all the literature on the subject of the factors contributing
to the gradual decline of agricultural prosperity, we seldom, if ever, see the declining
availability of credit listed as a factor. In fact, during the past few decades when
the level of agricultural welfare has shown signs of sinking most rapidly, there has
been a gradual extension of credit available to the farmer on more favorable terms
than ever. The federal government through the Farm Credit Administration has
contributed more than its share to this development. Under present day conditions
a farmer's lack of security and the unavailability of credit to him are usually results
of his distress and not its causes. The influence of institutional arrangements conducive to the poverty of certain classes can hardly be overcome by the creation of
debts.
Quite true, to a certain degree, the availability of credit is a factor in the success or failure of an individual farmer, but the presence of credit alone is no assurance
of success-the thing in itself has no particular value. It is the efficient-production
functioning of credit which renders it a real asset in individual farming operations.
Intelligently granted credit should constitute the means by which the individual
farmer commands land and instrumental wealth commensurate with his ability to
set up an efficient, economic farming unit. Furthermore, such credit wisely placed
should result in a value ratio of output to input which exceeds i, else there can
be no net value return for his operations. The first essential, therefore, in an
analysis of the value of his operations is to regard credit as means and not as end.
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Accordingly, this point of view leads to several corollaries of the original proposition,
namely, (i) the credit must not be used to purchase over-valued instruments in the
form of land, teams, or tools; (2) it must be adequate to equip an economic farm
production unit; (3) the expenditure of credit must be apportioned among land
and other capital goods according to the system, or systems, of farming best adapted
to the area. Practically every one of these fundamental principles was widely and
consistently violated throughout the program, especially where rehabilitation was
instituted as if it were a program solely to get rural people off direct and work relief
by placing them back on the soil primarily to raise their own food.
Apropos the first principle mentioned above, the reader should recall that many
rehabilitation clients, especially those who by usual occupation were share croppers
or farm laborers, for the most part had neither land nor teams and tools to farm on
their own account. These had to be provided by the Rehabilitation Corporation
operating in a particular state.0 Good land in most instances was not available

from landlords for occupancy-and especially perhaps for only temporary occupancyby tenants of the type that for the most part were being rehabilitated. Consequently
much poor land was purchased or leased at prices which under normal circumstances
would have secured lands of the best quality. Such lands were subdivided into small
tracts, often not more than five or ten acres, and to most of them old shacks had to
be moved or in other cases hovels existing thereon had to be renovated. The construction of fences, barns, and sheds, and the digging of wells presented other problems. It was in the administration of this part of the program that its weakest
links were to be found.
Had it been a matter of paying the cash rent, or lease money, for land upon
which an existing tenant was residing, and of advancing money for teams and tools
which he had already committed himself to pay for, the task would have been
greatly simplified. However, no such easy situation existed. In the first place, land
had to be bought or leased. The latter course usually was followed. In lieu of direct
payment of rent to the landlord, the Rehabilitation Division (then within the
F.E.R.A.) was to apply the lease money to the erection of improvements upon the
land in an amount not to exceed the value of the lease for a period ranging from
one to five years. This amount became the obligation of the client who was to be
rehabilitated thereon. The rehabilitation applied chiefly to the property, of the landowner, but since he could not feel assured of the usefulness of such a small tract of
land thus improved after the expiration of the lease period, and was skeptical at
tinmes of the character of the man placed thereon, he wanted for the use of the land
a sum commensurate with its average productivity plus liberal compensation for the
risks involved. Necessarily the client, then, was obligated to pay for the use of his
land a sum more than its productivity-at times, for only a three or five year's lease,
a sum which would have been sufficient to give him title to the land in fee simple.
'Authorization had been granted to both the Resettlement Administration and Rehabilitation Corporations to expend money for the purchase or lease of land as well as to buy livestock and irquipment.
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He had little choice in the matter, since arrangements for the land were made by
his immediate rehabilitation supervisor. He could accept the terms or go unrehabilitated.
But this was only the alpha of his difficulties. Neither he nor his immediate
rehabilitation supervisor could assume the responsibility of erecting or remodeling
the house, constructing the outbuildings, or digging the well, etc. The development
work was turned over to the Work Division of the F.ER.A., which for the most
part utilized relief labor in making the designated improvements. The assumption
was, of course, that the contemplated improvements could be completed within the
allowance made for the lease or rental of the land. It usually turned out like the
farmer's bread and molasses-they would not come out even, and the improvements
often were only partially completed. When the money allotment for such work
was exhausted, there were no additional funds available for the completion of the
job. The landowner would not do it for the benefit of the client or the government;
the tenant would not do it if the improvements were immediately to become the
property of the landowner; the government could not add more to the bill in payment for land which the client had not gotten.
Nevertheless, when this stage of development was reached, it was perhaps already
March, or April, perhaps even well up in May. The time was long past for the client
to move into his new rehabilitation location. Not even the earlier preparations for
a crop, those ordinarily made by January i, such as plowing the land, had been
started. Despite these handicaps, when he moved in, he probably found a shack
with no floor, or if a floor, only a partially completed roof. Possibly the shanty had
been completed, but he found no shed for his chickens, no barn for feed, or even a
pen in which he could keep his mule (also sadly in need of rehabilitation) to prevent his straying over the crops that possibly would be growing later. If he had
proceeded to the back yard, he would have found perhaps a well dug almost to
water, but not quite. Yet the Work Division, having already exhausted the funds
allotted for development, had moved elsewhere to repeat its haphazard performance.
Possibly for the duration of his stay on the place the client would have to haul his
water on a sled from some well or spring a mile or two away.
An incident, which is rather amusing-but not to the party involved-was the
experience of a client on such a partially improved location in East Texas. He had a
mule with eyes none too good, but the mule had neither pen nor pasture. The
farmer also had a well, but the well had no water, nor did it have a cover over it.
The mule, while slumbering one night, walked in his sleep. Fate determined that
he should fall in the well, but the well was not a very deep one. The client had
neither the means to remove the unhappy mule, nor the authority to hire anyone at
government expense with equipment to get him out. He could only notify the
rural supervisor, who, upon consulting his rehabilitation Hoyle, found that the use
of government funds was permitted only for the purchase of subsistence or capital
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goods. Nothing could be found pertaining to expenditures involved in getting a
client's mule out of a well. The State Office was immediately notified, but matters
involving deviations from the letter of the law had to clear through the Regional
Office in Oklahoma, which also had to consult Washington on similar matters. The
last report was that the mule was patiently waiting while officials conferred on rules
of procedure. This incident, of course, is a rare case, but occasions were numerous
in which the procedure bogged down in red tape and rigid rules of order. Those
in the field charged with getting the job done had a superabundance of responsibility
but very little authority. On the whole, the motives were worthy, but the means to
the ends were circuitous and expensive. All the while the advances of funds, even
for unfinished work, were charged to the account of the client.
The program would not have looked so gloomy had a client worthy of the effort
been giving a farming unit somewhere near the economic family-sized unit prevailing
in his area. On the contrary the client was set up under conditions not greatly
different from those which were generally accepted as contributing factors to his
inability to weather the storm of the depression. It can be called "rehabilitation" in
the sense that the clients were provided for so long as federal funds were forthcoming, or in that they were not still on work relief. But the program is hardly "rehabilitation" from the standpoint of a corrective program that looks toward permanent readjustment with the view to achieving higher standards of living with a
modicum of security from a repetition of their existing distress.
By way of summary, rehabilitation clients, in the main, were located under the
following conditions:
(i) On relatively small farms, a factor which is a large contributor to existing maladjustment.

The land was usually relatively poor, nationally recognized as a depressing factor.
(3) Both land and equipment were frequently purchased at inflated prices.
(4) Farm plans provided chiefly for the growing of subsistence goods only, which at
best should constitute only about 35% of the normal farm family budget.
(5) The small-scale setup frequently contemplated only part-time farming, i.e., that a
client would find employment outside of farming to supplement his deficient farm income.
Part-time farming is worthy of consideration in most farming areas of the United States
only if the part-time farmer's outside employment is suffciently remunerative to allow him
to forget his farming. When times are good, he probably can do this; when depressions
hit, he has no job, and his small subsistence patch becomes only a squatter's plot, and the
part-time farmer becomes a relief client.
(6) Practically all clients were located only on arable land while the aptitudes and
experiences of some better qualified them for gaining a livelihood in the production of
livestock.
(7) The particular systems of farming best adapted to the locality in which the client
was located had little influence upon the size of his unit or the nature of the program
outlined for him.
(8) The depths to which one had sunk, and the character of his needs were relatively
small factors in determining whether he was chosen for rehabilitation. Generally the
(2)
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lower his position the less likelihood he had of becoming a client. Relatively more owners
and tenants than share croppers and laborers were selected for rehabilitation. In proportion to their numbers, only half as many negroes were selected for rehabilitation as
were whites, and when selected, advances received by them were hardly half those received
by white clients, in similar stations.
(9) The amount and quality of the teams and tools assigned a client were hardly
commensurate with the amount of land allotted him, thus sacrificing the efficiency of an
optimum relation between the man, land, and equipment factors of production.
The plight of the rehabilitation client can be inferred from the table below of
the sizes of farms operated by relief and rehabilitation clients, and of those operated
by all farmers (even including those on relief) during the year 1935.
COMPARATIVE SIZE OF FARMs OPERATED BY ALL FARMERS, BY AREAS, AND TYPES
7
AND THOSE OPERATED BY RELIEF AND REHABILITATION CLIENTS

Average by Areas
All Areas:
O wners ...........................
Tenants ...........................
Croppers ..........................
Eastern Cotton
O wners ............................
Tenants ...........................
Croppers ..........................
Western Cotton
O w ners ............................
Tenants ...........................
Croppers ...........................
Appalachian-Ozark
O w ners ............................
Tenants ...........................
Croppers* .........................
Lake States Cut-over

OF TENURE,

Average Number of Acres per Farm
Rehabilitation
All Farmere
Relief Case?
Casesb

'7'

38

x26

26

43
43

40

23

28

1i6

37

64
37

20

38
33
27

19

O wners ............................

Tenants ...........................
Croppers . .........................
Average by Types of Crops
Hay and Dairy
Owners ........................
Tenants ...........................
Croppers . .........................
' U. S. CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, '1935.

'June, 1935.
No share croppers, or only negligible amount.
Adapted from Farmers on Relief and Rural Rehabilitation, op. cit. supra note 4, Tables
pp. 64 and 65.
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Corn Belt

Owners ...........................
Tenants ...........................
Croppers . .........................

157
164
--

77

87

103

120

Owners ............................ 745

348

360

Tenants

482

332

341

423
304
-

144
96

198

Owners ............................

899

162

149

Tenants ...........................
Croppers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

445
--

120

i6o

-

Spring Wheat
...........................

Winter Wheat
Owners ................
....
Tenants ...........................
Croppers . .........................

159
-

Ranching

An analysis of the data above reveals a most striking contrast in the size of farms
operated by farmers on relief and rural rehabilitation within given areas. They
point also rather conclusively to the chief determining factor in the causes, of the
distress, as well as to the road to reconstruction. An interesting side-light here is
the observation that distressed so-called "owners" usually operated smaller farms
than did tenants in the immediate vicinity. This is conclusive evidence, it seems,
that ownership without respect to equity and to the adequacy of the farm unit may
represent a process of "freezing" on the agricultural ladder rather than of ascending
it. We too frequently talk loosely of climbing an "agricultural ladder" that is
lying flat on the ground. Despite the implications involved, many Resettlement
Administration officials have fostered the participation of tenants in what must remain a form of useless exercise, unless, and until, there is an intelligent attack on
the institutional factors conducive to poverty and, therefore, tenancy. For example,
in the Lake States Cut-over Area, 78% of the rural relief cases represented owneroperators who could exist only at a relatively poor level even in normal times.
Ownership of uneconomic farm units on poor land is no indication of any successful
climb up the agricultural ladder. For the most part "ownership" is only a legal
concept which has had assigned to it any number of economic implications which
essentially it does not possess.
Also, with respect to the amount and value of livestock and equipment possessed
by the distressed owners on small-scale farms, the owner-operators were at a disadvantage in comparison with the better grade tenants who had put the whole of their
limited capital into teams, tools, and equipment rather than a portion of it into
poor land, resulting in a deficiency of each factor of production. Likewise, tenants
on relief were deficient in the ownership of these means of production as compared
to those owned by their associates off relief and rehabilitation. All these major
factors of production represent wealth, which represents earning capacity by some
one somewhere along the line. What American farmers in chronic distress need,
therefore, is more earning, or income-yielding, capacity. For the most part this end
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can be achieved more effectively through long-time planning than through shorttime lending.
Even though rehabilitation as has been carried on has its merits as an emergency
measure, the exigencies of the situation in such a time preclude the possibility of the
adoption of the most effective measures for long-run results. The rational thing to
do is to avert the possibility of distress by making adjustments during normal times
in land use, the distribution of the rural population, and in existing systems of farming. It was the early recognition of this fact which accounted for the establishment
in the Resettlement Administration of the Division of Land Utilization, and, within
this division, of the Land Use Planning Section. But here again the machinery
could not "click" properly, largely because of the division of responsibility in numerous matters of procedure.
SOME UNPLANNED PLANNING

The recognition of the need for planning is one thing; to get plans made for
executing planning is quite another thing. To be agreed upon the objectives is not
so difficult, but the matter of what agencies, or sub-divisions, of a large organization
like the Resettlement Administration were to determine the means to achieve the
desired ends brought many delays and numerous blue-prints of plans back from
Washington to be done all over again. Often before the required revisions could be
made, some axe wielder in a particular section had changed his mind, or emergency
funds had been reshuffled, and the revisions also had been for naught.
The king pin in the set-up logically was planned land use. But the execution of
this program involved an almost inestimable number of laborious processes, chief
among which were the following:
(i) An inventory and dassification of the land supply of the nation.

An analysis of the nature and location of maladjustments in land use.
(3) An analysis of the nature, extent, and location of necessary readjustments to be
made.
(2)

(4) The determination of the extent and location of sub-marginal land areas used for

cropping which logically should be retired from such use and more appropriate uses found.
(5) The determination of the number and the location of families that might be involved in plans for relocating them on better land.
(6) The selection of suitable resettlement areas, and the planning, construction and

development of resettlement projects.
(7) The optioning, appraisal, aid purchase of lands for resettlement, retirement, or
reforestation as the particular situation may warrant.

(8) The legal work connected with the examination of abstracts, deeds, etc.
(9) Processes incident to making payment for lands leased or purchased.
(xo) Architectural work in connection with the planning of farm houses, the erection
of community social centers, cooperative canning plants, etc.
(ii) Engineering work in connection with the construction of buildings, roads, drainage systems, etc.
(2) Business management functions incident to the stocking of supplies, the issuance
of travel orders, handling the mailing and filing system, etc.
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(03) Accounting work in connection with keeping records of money spent and still

available, issuing salary checks, etc.
The list could continue almost without end. All in all, there was an effort to
group these various tasks into several divisions, each of which was divided into
sections and these into units and sub-units. However, since the chief objective was
planning, there should have been a classification of the various divisions into (i)
policy-determining divisions, and (2) service divisions. The function of the latter
would have been to serve more or less as auxiliary units in the execution of plans.
There was much talk of policy-determining functions, and policy-executing functions,
but nobody could feel sure who had what. The intricacies were legion, but a specific
case will suffice to illustrate the major aspect of the problem.
For instance, the work of the Land Use Planning Section was to be basic to the
entire program. It classified the land, designated the sub-marginal land areas for
retirement and the areas for resettlement. It had the responsibility for designating
the areas where the farms were too small, where the farming population was pressing
upon rural opportunities, and the areas where certain systems of farming had the
greatest likelihood of succeeding. If only it had had the authority to follow through
the various steps in the process of readjustment, there probably would have been
much less done for which it was generally felt that someone owed an apology.
When the Land Use Planning Section designated an area as suitable for resettlement, this was done because of evidence that it was a "good" land area. But good
land is only a relative rather than an absolute concept. It is good only in relation
to a certain price limit, in relation to certain types of crops, farming systems, and

especially only in relation to the size of farm unit set up for which the area is best
adapted. A most important factor also is whether it is good enough for one thousand
dollars' worth of land to support an additional investment overhead (largely nonproductive) of some five or six thousand dollars. Even a good resettlement area is
not fool-proof against every conceivable sort of farm management blunder, procedure
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Once the selection of the area was made, it then fell into the hands of one or
more development units. An engineer could (and did in many instances) plan to
run roads through the middle of the best crop land section, he could locate farm
residences a half mile from the pasture land, or cut the whole resettlement area, gridiron fashion, into sixty-acre blocks without regard to the amount and quality of the
land which fell into each tract. Those responsible for the planning and erection of
farm houses could plan $5,000 homes with hand-finished floors and shellacked knotholes on a tract of land that would stagger under the weight of a $2,ooo structure.
The selection *ofthe area might be made on the assumption that not less than eighty
acres could possibly constitute an economic family unit, and some one would come
down from Washington with ready-made plans for units consisting, of only 24 acres.
This identical thing happened in connection with program planning in the old
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Southeast after the Land Use Planning Section recommended not less than eightyacre tracts, and felt a bit apologetic for doing that.
Furthermore the Rural Rehabilitation Division was permitted to carry on its
most intensive program of rehabilitation in areas which the Land Use Planning
Section had already designated as definite "Problem Areas," and where the continuation of farming operations should have been discouraged. The production of
crops was recommended for many farmers whose aptitudes would have assured
greater success on larger units utilized for combination livestock-crop farming.
Within a given resettlement project farms were almost without exception of uniform
size, ignoring the differences in individual managerial capacities and the size of
families. A farmer in a designated sub-marginal land purchase area could option
his land to the government, and wait possibly a year and a half before the Legal
Division could pass on the abstract of title so he could obtain his pay. In the meantime, land values might be rising and farms once available already taken up. He
was a big loser for his reluctant cooperation, and maladjustments were being incubated almost as fast as readjustments were consummated.
Of recent date, however, developments point upward. An old, established agency,
the United States Department of Agriculture, has inherited the task of carrying on.
It has a large corps of well-trained technicians. The emergency period of the program has apparently passed. Another encouraging sign is the fact that steps already
have been taken in Washington to coordinate activities in all phases of land utilization work. If this objective can be achieved, and authority can accompany responsibility, lasting adjustments may yet be wrought. At any rate, the critical
nature of the problem warrants the best job that human ingenuity can give to it.
It will be better that it be poorly done than not tackled at all.

